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A STOCHAST IC  TWO-TARGET PURSUIT -EVASION 
D IFFERENTIAL  GAME WITH THREE PLAYERS 
MOVING IN  A PLANE 
Y. YAVIN 
National Research Institute for Mathematical Sciences, CSIR, P.O. Box 395, Pretoria 0001, South Africa 
Abstract--A stochastic version of a two-target homicidal chauffeur pursuit evasion differential game 
between a player P on one side and players Qt and Q~ on the other side is considered. This is used to 
model a dogfight between two very agile players, Qi and Q2, and a much less maneuverable player P. 
Sufficient conditions on optimal strategies are derived. These conditions require the existence of a properly 
smooth solution to a nonlinear partial differential equation on a generalized torus in ~. By applying a 
finite-difference method, the equation is solved numerically, and optimal strategies are computed. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Stochastic dogfight differential games involving three players, P on one side and Q~ and Q_~ on the 
other side, moving in the (x, ),)-plane are considered. The differential games dealt with here are 
based on a noise-corrupted kinematic model. The maneuverability of the players is determined by 
their minimum turning radii Rp, Ro, and Ro_~ respectively. It is assumed here that Ro, = Ro, = O. 
We suppose that player P has a weapon system with range pp and a half-squint-angle ~, and that 
each of the players Q~ and Q_, has a weapon system with an all-aspect range of Pc). In addition, 
if for some t >~ 0, the distance between P and Q~ d(P, Q~) ~> Ro, then, P and Q, break off contact, 
i e ~ 1, 2}. The goal of  player P is to intercept at least one of the players Q~ or Q~, or to break off 
contact with at least one of them before being intercepted by either one of them. The goal of  players 
Qt and Q~ is that at least one of them will intercept P before P intercepts or breaks off contact 
with either one of them. 
Pursuit-evasion differential games with n >t 2 pursuers and one evader have been considered by 
many authors (see, for example, [ l - I  1]). In addition, differential games with two targets (see, for 
example, [12-14]) and, in particular, differential games concerning a dogfight between two players 
in a plane [15 17] have also been treated in the past few years. However, in all of these works 
(except for [11], [14] and [17]), the problems dealt with are deterministic, while the problems 
considered here are stochastic. This work is to some extent complementary to [1 1] and [7]. In [1 1], 
a stochastic pursuit evasion differential game, with two pursuers and one evader moving in the 
(x, y )-plane, is treated. There, the case where Rp= RQ, = RQ2~-O is dealt with, and simple 
characterizations of optimal strategies are deduced. In [1 7], a dogfight between two players, P and 
Q, moving in the (x,) ,) -plane, is considered, by using a stochastic version (in polar coordinates) 
of  the equations of  motion of  the "Homicidal Chauffeur Game"  (see [18] for the original 
deterministic version). Using this model, stochastic differential games with complete observation 
and stochastic differential games with partial observation are dealt with. The optimal strategy for 
player P found in this work turned out to be a generalization of the optimal strategy of player P 
found in [17], in the case of  complete observation and where the speed of P was smaller than that 
of Q. 
2. FORMULAT ION OF THE PROBLEM 
Consider the random motion of  three points P and Q;, i =- 1,2, in the (x, y )-plane. Suppose 
that each of the velocities (Up cos 0p, Up sin 0v) of P, (u o cos OQ~, UQ sin 0o,) of  Q~ and (UQ cos Oo:, 
UQ sin 0Q2) of  Q2 is perturbed by a corresponding ~2-valued Gaussian white noise; Up and uQ are 
given positive numbers. The maneuverabil ity of the players is determined by their minimum turning 
radii, Rv, RQ, and Ro: respectively. It is assumed here that Ro, = Ro: = 0. Hence, player P steers 
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by selecting the value of the curvature of  his trajectory at each instant; let ~b ~ [ -  1, 1] be the control 
that player P uses to determine his actual turning radius. Each of the two agile players, Qj and 
Q2. steers by choosing, at each instant, his direction of travel, i.e. 0Q, and 0~, respectively. 
We assume that the game begins at t = 0. Thus, the equations of motion of P, Qr and Q, are 
given by 
f dxp = Up cos 0pdt + Crp dWLv 
d)'p = up sin 0p dt + ap dW2p 
dOp = upR6 I q5 dt 
t > 0 (I) 
and 
dx~, = uQcos 0~, dt + aQ dW~Q, 
dye, u o sin 0o, dt + aQ d W_~Q, 
t > 0 (2) 
i = 1,2, where (x v. yp) and (xQ,, ye, ), i = I, 2, denote the coordinates of players P and Qi, i = 1,2, 
respectively: ap and % are given positive numbers: and W~ = { Wp(t) = [Ww(t), W2r(t)], t >t 0 I, 
WQ, = { Wo, ( t )= [W~o,(t), W2o,(t)], t ~> 0}, i = 1,2 are ~2-valued standard Wiener processes. It is 
assumed that Wp, WQ, and W~ are mutually independent. 
By fixing the origin of a new coordinate system at the position occupied by P and considering 
the relative motion of players P, Q~ and Q2 in polar coordinates, where r, is the range from P to 
Q~ and [3, is the bearing of Q from P, i = I, 2 (see Fig. 1), we obtain, in the same manner as in 
[I 1]. the following equations for 0% f~), i = 1,2 and 0r: 
dr, = [uo cos(0Q, - [3,) - upcos(Oe -/:~,)] dt + a dWt i  
dfi, = r, t[uQ sin(0Q, - fli) - Up sin(0e - fl,)] dt + ar, ~ dW2i (3) 
i=  I. 2, and 
dO v = upRp I ck dr, (4) 
where a 2 = a~ + ~r~, and W~ = { W~(t) = [W,,(t), W,_~(t)], t/> 0}, i = 1,2 are N2-valued standard 
Wiener processes. It is assumed that the processes W~ and W, are chosen in such a manner that 
they are mutually independent. 
Q 
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Fig. I. The geometry of the encounter. 
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Suppose that player P has a "weapon system" with range pp and half squint angle :~, i.e. if for 
some t >~0, r~(t)<~ pp and 10p(t)-f l~(t)l  <<, ~, we say that player Qi has been intercepted by P, 
i ~ { 1,2}. Also, suppose that each of the players Q~ and Q: has a "'weapon system" with range Po, 
po<~pp, i.e. if for some t>O,  r,(t)<~p~) and 10p(t) -  flM)l > ~, we say that player P has been 
intercepted by Q,, i ~ { 1, 2}. Once a player has been intercepted, the game terminates. In addition. 
if for some t >~ O, r~(t) >1 Ro before any of the players has been intercepted, than P and Q,, i e { 1, 2}, 
break off contact and the game terminates. It is assumed that up, uo, %,  a o, Rp, pp, ~, Po and 
R0 are known to all players. The goal of player P is to intercept Q~ or Q:, or both of them (at 
the same instant), or to break off contact with at least one of them. The goal of players Q~ and 
Q2 is that at least one of them will intercept P. Only cases where up < u~) are considered here. 
Denote x~ gr  I , x2gr2 ,  x3~O P --  1~1, -\'4& 0P-  /J2" OI g0O I -- [Jl and 02& 0o: - fl~. Then, by using 
equations (3)-(4), the following reduced state space equations for the encounter are introduced: 
dxt = [UQ COS 01 - UpCOS x3] d /  -I-O- dW~l 
dx  2 -~ [UQ COS 0~ --  /tr, COS x4] dt + cr d W~. 
dx3 = {upRp 105 _ ii (X)X( I[ttO sin 0~ - up sin .x31~ dt 
- J l (x )~x l  ~dW2, 
dx4 = {upRp~ qb - I2(x)x2 I[u o sin 0. - Up sin .~C4]~ dt 
- J2 (x )ax2  ' dW~e, (5) 
where x = (x,, x2, x3, x4). 
The functions I~ and J,, i = 1,2, are introduced here to guarantee the existence of solutions to 
equations (5) over the whole of [R4. In fact, we are interested in these solutions only over a bounded 
subset D, D c [R4, which will be defined later. Thus, L and J~, i = 1, 2, are given by 
Ux)~=J l  xe lx :x ,>( ,  .r2>1~, (x3, x~)e[R 2} 
otherwise, (6) 
where 0 < (<<pc), and Ji is such that J ,(x) = 1 for x e {x: ( <~ x~ <~ Ro,~ <~ x2 ~ Ro, (x~,x4) ~ JR2}: 
J ,(x)x, ~ is continuous on N4 and satisfies 0 < (0 ~< [J~(x)x, ~]z< M < ~c for all x • [R~, for some 
q) and M. 
We assume that all players have complete observation of x. Denote by U0 the class of all 
strategies v = (01,02,4)) --- {[01(x), O:(x). 05(x)1, x e R 4} such that 0, : [Re-+N, 02: [R4._. [R and 05: 
N4--+ [R are bounded and measurable functions, and I 05(x)1-..<1 for all x e R 4. 
Let v = (0~, 02, qS)e U0. Then, [191, equations (5) determine a stochastic process ~', = ~ ~' , ( t )= 
[~);, it), ~.2(t), ~';3(t), ~)(.4(t)], t >t 0}. c[;(0) = x. such that c[)( is a weak solution (in the sense of [19]) 
to equations (5) associated with a family {P[, x e g~4} of probabil ity measures, and such that 
{(;';, P'(), x e [R4} is a family of strong Markov processes. Furthermore,  the weak infinitesimal 
operator  of this family is given by 
~(0, ,  0,, 05 )V(x)  
= [UQ cos 0~ (x) -- Up cos x3]¢? V(x)/ax, + [u 0 cos 02(x) - up cos x4]/? V(x)/ax2 
+ {upRp 1 05(x) - I~ (x)x i ~ [UQ sin 01 (x) -- up sin x3]}?V(x)/?x~ 
+ {upR~'05(x) - I2(x)x 2 I[uQ sin 02(x) - Up sin x~]l~V(x)/?x~ 
+ (a2/2)[a2V(x)/ax~ + a2V(x)/ax~ + J~(x)xi  2~?2V(x)/Ox~ 
+ J~(x)x2 2aZV(x)/¢3x4] (7) 
for any V~C~(ff~4). 
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where 0 < ~ <<po. 
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Kp2, Ko2, K, A, A o. B and D the following sets in ~4: 
D0& {x: 0 < x, < Ro, 0 < x2 < R0, (x~, x4) ~ ~-'}, (8) 
n =0,  +1 +'~ _v4e~}, (9) 
KQ, A{x:0<x,~<¢~O,~ ~<xe~<Ro-~.xeKp,  UKe:}, (10) 
__& l  . 
Kp2 - - " ix .  0 "4 x 2 ~ pp ,  { -~ x I ~ R 0 - (, .k 1 e 1]~, x 4 = -v4 4- 2/Tyg, 
I.?~1 ~<~,n =0,  _+1, +2 . . . .  }, ( l l )  
K & Km Ulna, U Kpz U K~ e, I13) 
=,x .xeK .  O<xl<~ or O<x2<~} 
A ~(Kpl UKee) ~ (14) 
k~{g. . . . .  v,>/Ro or x,>~Rol, (15i 
~=DoN K'NA'  (16) 
Note that thc encounter takes place on D. Once ~.(t) leaves the set D, the game terminates, and 
we disregard the subsequent motion. In this case, if ~( t )e  Kp,, then player Q, is intercepted by P, 
i e {1,2}; if ~',(t)e Ko,. then player P is intercepted by player Q,, i e{I .  21; and if ~',(t)¢ B, then 
player P breaks off contact with player Qt or player Q~, or both. 
Denote by r(x: v) the first exit time of ¢', from D, 
~ inf{t:~,(t)(ED when ~i (0 )=.v~D I 
r ( .v ;v )&~0 if ~(0)=.veD 
[ ,~ if ~',(t)ED forall t >1-0. (17) 
Also, define the following class of strategies: 
U, =~ {v = (0~, 0:, 0) E Uo: sup E~ ¢(.-,: v) < re'l- (18) 
~,"D 
where E~ denotes the expectation operator with respect o P~, and define the following functional: 
V(x; v)&P~({('((r(x; v))EKmUKmUB}.), v e/J'~, x ~ @4. (19~ 
In other words, V(x; v) is the probability of the event {Player P intercepts at least one of the 
players Qj or Qe or breaks off contact with at least one of them; before being intercepted by either 
one of them, the strategy v is being applied and at t = O, (r~, r2, Op- flj, Op- [J:) = x}. Owing to 
the nature of the variables -v3 and -v4, x~ = Op- [.~j,.'q = 0p-  fie, we confine ourselves to the 
following choice of the class of admissible strategies U: 
U ~= [v = (O I, Oe, O) e Uj : V(xl, x2, x3 + 2mrc, x 4 + 2nTt', v) 
= V(x;v), _v~ 4, m,n =0,__1,_+2 . . . .  ]. (20) 
The problem dealt with in this paper is: find a strategy v*= (O*, 0", 0" )e  U such that 
V(x; (0~', 0". ~)) <~ V(x; v*) <~ V~x;(O,, 02, 0") )  
forany (0" ,0" ,~) ,  (O~,02,0*)eU andall _reD. (21) 
A strategy v*e U, for which inequalities (21) are satisfied, will here be called an optimal strateey. 
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3. SUFF IC IENT CONDIT IONS ON OPTIMAL STRATEGIES 
Let ,9 denote the class of all functions V: ~4 ~ ~ such that V is continuous on the closure/3~ 
of Do and twice continuously differentiable on D, and such that S(O~, 02, O)V e L~_(D NS) for any 
(01,02, 4')e U, where 
S = {X: --T[ ~-~ X~ ~ 7"[', --7~ ~ X 4 ~ ~]', (22) 
It follows from [19] that, for a given v e U~ and any V e 9,  
E'~. V(~(z(x;  v))) = V(x) + EI~ t ¢'':'' 5g(0~, 02, 4')V(?','~(t)) dt, x e D. (23) 
do 
Lemrna l 
Let V e @ be a solution, for a given v = (Ol, 02, 4') e U, to the problem: 
ff'(O~,G,4')V(x)=O, xeD,  
V(x)=l ,  xeKptUKp2UB; V(x)=0,  
V(x,, x2, x3 + 2rnlt, x4 + 2n~) = V(x), x e Do, 
Then, 
(24) 
X 6 KQI U KQ2 U AQ (25) 
m,n =0, +1, +2 . . . .  (26) 
V(x) = V(x; v) = P)~.(~',.(r(x; v))eKel@Kp2OB), x eDo. 
Proof 
By using the fact that U c U~, the proof follows directly from equation (23). 
(27) 
Proof 
and all xeD.  (31) 
By using equation (23) and Lemma 1, the proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.1 of [20] and 
is theretbre omitted. 
Denote 
To -a {x: 0 < xl < Ro,0 < x2 < R0, - l r  ~< x3 <~ ~, - r t  ~< x4 ~ rt}, (32) 
Tpi~=Kp, NTo, i=1 ,2 ;  TQi~KQif)To, i=1 ,2 ,  (33) 
T~Q~.4Qf"ITo; Ts~-BNTo; Ta=DNTo . (34) 
Then, 
V(x; (0", 0", 4))) ~< V0(x) = V(x; (0". 0", 4'*)) ~< V(x; (o,, 02, 4'*)) 
for any (O*,O*,4') ,(G,O,,4'*)eU 
Theorem l
Suppose that there exist a strategy v*= (0", 0",  4 '*)e U and a function V~e9 such that 
~'(o*. o~. O )v,,(x) <<. ~(o* ,  07, ¢ * )v,,(x) = o <<. ~(o, ,  o2, 4' * )Vo(X) 
forany (0",0",4') ,(0~,02,4'*)eU andall xeD,  (28) 
l /o (x )=l ,  xeKp1UKp2UB; V0(x)=0, xeKQ, UKQ2UA Q, (29) 
Vo(xl,x2,x3+2mn, x4+2nrt)= Vo(x), xeDo,  m,n=O, +1,+_2 . . . . .  (30) 
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By assuming that there exist a strategy v* = (0",  0" .  (~*) • U and a function V~ • ~ that satisfy 
equations (28) (30), it follows that such a pair (v*, V0) may be found by solving the following 
problem: 
[uQ cos 0~ (x) - up cos x~]~ V(x )/c~.v~ + [uQ cos 0, (x) - u~ cos x418 V(x) /Sx2 
q-" {UpRp I q~(x)  - -  X I I[ttQ sin 0~ (x) - Up sin x3]}t?V(x)/Sx 3 
+ ~Up Rp ~ q~ (x) - x~ ~ [u~ sin 0~ (x) - Up sin .v4]}8 V(x) /?x4 
+ (O" 2/2)[? 2 V (.v)/~x ~ + ¢'~ 2V( x" ),/(')A" ~ + .V t 2r3 ~ V(X )/(')A'2 
+ _~'~ ?2V(.V)/C~X]] = O, .v • T, (35) 
V(x)=I ,  . v~TmUTpeUTu;  V(x)=0,  x~To,  UTo2UTao,  (36) 
V(x~, x2, x3 + i~r, x4 +.in) = V(x~, x , ,  x3 - in, xa - j r~) i , j  = O, 1, x • f~, (37) 
cos 0, (x) = - ( c~V(x) /gx ,  )/a, (x) ,  
and 
sin 0~ (x) : xj 1(¢? V(x)/Sx3)/A1 (x)  
AI(x) : [(SV(x)/(~x I )2 + xi 2(SV(x)/Sx3)2]l,,2 x • T (3~j 
cos 0~ (x) = - (i~ V(x) /?x2 )/A~ (x), 
sin 02 (x) = x ~ 1(~ V(x) /Sx4 )/'z~2 (x)  
A2(x) = [(~?V(x)/~x,) ~+ x~ 2(~?V(x)/~?xD2] t:2, x • T (39) 
~b(x) = sign[?~V(x)/(~x~ + (?V(x)/t?x~], x • T. (40) 
In order to obtain more insight into the encounter, the following problems are dealt with here: 
Problem a 
Solve equations (35)-(40). Denote by l/( .; v * ) the solution to these equations; v* = (0" ,  0" ,  ~h * ) 
is an optimal strategy [in the sense of  inequalities (21)]. 
Problem b 
Solve equations (35) (39) where ~b = 4) j is given by 
~bl(x)=J'-signx3.~ if xl<~x2 (41) 
( - s ignx4  if x~ > x2. 
Denote by V(.; v~ ), v~ = (01,0~, ~b~), the solution to these equations. Note that in the rt. r:, [~, [;, 
and 0v coordinates (see Fig. 1) 
~f -s ign(0p- f l l )  if rl<-Gr2 
~ ' (x )=Cb( r " r2 ' [$" f l2 'Op)=[ -s ign(Op f12) if r ,>r2 .  (42) 
From Theorem l it follows that 
V(x ; (O~,O~,qh~))<.V(x ; (O~,02 ,4) ' ) )  fo rany  (O~,02,ck~)EU andal l  . v•T .  (43) 
Problem c 
Solve equations (35) (37) and (40) where 0~ = 0~ and 02 = O~ satisfy 
O~(x) = O~(x) = ~r, x • T. (44) 
Denoted by V(.; v2), v2 = (0~, 0~, (52). the solution to these equations. In this case, each of the 
players, Qt and Q2, applies the "l ine-of-sight" guidance law toward P. From Theorem 1 it follows 
that 
V(x ; (O~,O~,qh) )<~V(x ; (O~,O~,~2) )  fo rany  (O~,O~,dp)•U andal l  x~T.  (45) 
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4. A NUMERICAL  STUDY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Denote by R~ the following finite-difference grid on ~ 
~4~-{(ih,, jh2, kh3, th4):i,j, k, l = O, +_ 1, ++_2 . . . .  }. (46) 
Define a 4 T0h = ~J,f) To. Equations (35)-(40), or equations (35)-(39) and (41), or equations (35)-(37), 
(40) and (44), have here been solved by using an upwind finite-difference method on ~4, similar 
to that described in [21]. Computations were carried out by using the following set of parameters: 
R 0 = 10 4, R e -2000,  pp = 4000, 6000; pQ = 2000, c~ = rt/6, re/4, rt/3, 7r/2; u o = 330, up = 180, 210. 
240, 270, 300; a :=25,  and (i) h~=h2= 1000, h3=h4=rt /8 ;  (ii) h i=h,=500,  h3=h4=rr/12.  
Denote by V~'(.: v) (v =v* ,  v~,v2) the solution to the finite difference equations obtained by 
applying the upwind finite-difference method on the partial differential equations and their 
boundary conditions, and by N(h) the number of points in L~h. Define 
P"(v) A ~ Vh(ih,,jh2,kh3,1h4;v)/N(h) v = v* ,h ,v , .  
(ih I . jh 2 , kh~. lh4) ~ TOh 
(47) 
Some of the numerical results obtained here are presented in Tables 1 5. The results suggest he 
following conclusions: 
(i) The strategy v~ = (0 I, 0~, 4) ~), defined in Problem b, is an optimal strategy [in the sense of 
inequalities (21)]. Note that the numerical study had been conducted for up < uQ. 
(ii) The results (not shown here) indicate that, during the encounter, players Q~ and Q2 are not 
applying the guidance law 0~ (x) --- 02(x) = ~z, x ~ T. This implies that their maneuvers are 
more complicated. 
(iii) ph increases as ~, or up, or PP/Po increases. 
For the sake of comparison the following pursuit-evasion problem is treated. 
Table I. The values of P;'(v*) as functions 
or up and p.  for ~=rr,,6, / h=h:=1000,  
/h = ha = rt,'8. Here N(h) = 23,409 
u. pp =. 4000 pp = 6000 
180 0.15078 0.22688 
210 0 15080 0.24039 
240 1/.15080 0.251 l0 
270 0.15204 0.26445 
31111 0.15368 0.27739 
Table 2. The values of W(v*) as functions of u.  and :~ lot 
pp = 4000, /h = h~ = 1000, / h = h4 - rUB. Here N{h)  - 23,409 
u v :( = r~!6 :~ = rti3 = = rt/2 
180 0.15078 0.24445 0.41556 
210 0.15080 0.24446 0.41570 
240 0.15080 0.24446 0.41593 
270 0.15204 0.24448 0.41635 
300 0.15368 0.24453 0.41852 
Table 4. The values of W(v*) as functions of up and :~ for p, 4000, 
h~ = h~ = 500, I h = h~ = rt/12. Here N(h) -  225.625 
lap 9l = a /6  a = rr 4 ~ - ~,3  :~ - ~'2  
180 0.16145 0.22195 0.28027 0,39013 
210 0.16148 0.22196 0.28028 0,39016 
240 0,16150 0.22197 0.28028 0.39029 
270 0.16170 0.22199 0.28035 0.39048 
300 0.16284 0.22260 0,28080 0.39080 
gable i Tile ~alues of P%'i) as functions of u I, and 
h,t j~,,=4000. / t~=h,= 1000, h~=ha=rr ,8 .  Here N(h}= 
23,4tl9 
I 'q) 0.15087 (I.24451 0.4155 I 
2 I~) 0.151N3 I).24454 0.41559 
24O h. 15093 0,24459 0.41580 
270 Ii I 5196 0.24459 I).41619 
t~tJ I). 151~4 0.24513 0.41833 
Table 5 The values of P;'(tbl as functions of up and :~ for ,%-4000,  
h~ l* 2 = 500, h~=h4- -  rc l2.  Here N(h)  225.625 
180 0.16138 0,22192 11.28024 0.39012 
210 0.16141 0.22197 0.28027 0.39012 
240 0.16145 0.22201 0.28030 0.39017 
270 0.16173 0.22205 0.28035 0.39022 
300 0.16222 0.22224 0.28043 0.39052 
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Table 6. The values of Ph(v°) as functions of up for p~= 2000, u o = 330, Rp = 2000, 
h I = h 2 ~ 500, h 3 = h4 ~ rt/12. Here N(h) = 225,625 
up 180 210 240 270 300 
W(v 0 ) 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 
5. A PURSUIT EVASION DIFFERENTIAL  GAME 
In this section the following problem is dealt with: Player P's goal is to break off contact with 
at least one of the players Q~ or Q2, before being intercepted by either one of them. The goal of 
players Ql and Q2 is that at least one of them will intercept P before P breaks off contact with 
either one of them. 
Thus, by letting Kp~ = KF: = 0 (where 0 denotes the empty set), we obtain 
V(x; v) = P'~({{);(r(x; v))eB}), v e UI, x ~: [j~4. (48) 
Note that in this case (i.e. the case where Kpj and Kp2 are empty sets) ~.(r(x; v)) belong to either 
KQI[.JKQ2 or to B. 
If ~(~(x;v))~KQjUKo2, then P is intercepted by at least one of the players Q], Q2. If 
~'~(T (x; v)) ~ B, then P breaks off contact with at least one of the players Q~, Q2. Thus, the problem 
is to find a strategy v° 0 0 = (0j,02, 4 ~°)~ U such that 
V(x: (o'~, o °, 0)) <~ V(x; ,,0) ~< V(x: (o,, o~, 0°)) 
for any (0 °,0 °,~b),(0~,02,q~°)~U and all x6D.  (49) 
Equations (35)-(40), where Tp~ = Tp2 = 0, have been solved on [R~ by using the same finite- 
difference method as mentioned in the previous section. Denote by Vh( .;v °) the solution to the 
finite-difference equations. A comparison of the values of W(v °) (Table 6) with the values of W(v *) 
or Ph(v~ ) (Tables 1-5) suggests that Player P should always be offensive and try to intercept at least 
one of the players Q] or Qz (by applying the strategy ~b* or O J), rather than try to break off contact 
with at least one of them. A deterministic version of the problem, when to pursue or to evade, for 
the case of two players moving in a plane, is dealt with in [22]. In the game dealt with here, where 
up < u o, the answer for player P turned out to be simple: attack! 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, a stochastic version of a two-target homicidal chauffeur pursuit-evasion 
differential game, between one player on the one side and two players on the other side, has been 
proposed. This has been used to model a dogfight between two very agile players and a much less 
maneuverable player. The methods employed here make it possible to investigate three problem 
parameters that are important in combat, viz. speed, maneuverability and performance of the 
weapon systems (i,e. pp, ~ and po). In addition, a simple characterization for the optimal strategy 
of the less maneuverable player has been found. However, only cases where Up < Uo have been 
studied. 
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